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Abstract— As a complex technological innovation, e-
government needs a suitable framework to understand its 
success/failure. For its ability to capture the complexity of the 
interaction between the socio-cultural components as well as the 
involvement and the need to align the technical and political 
factors involved in e-government initiative, Actor Network 
Theory was chosen  to understand the success/failure of e-
government in a developing country. This paper provides 
evidences on the contribution of Actor Network Theory in such 
success/failure. The paper also recommends strategy for better 
design and implementation of the e-government. 
Keywords—e-government; actor network theory; developing 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
E-government is a broad-based transformation initiative, 
facilitated by ICT to deliver public services, manage 
constituent relationship and support the economic and social 
development [24]. However, most implementation of the e-
government in developing countries fail with 35 % being 
classified as total failures (not implemented or implemented 
but immediately abandoned), and 50 % as partial failures 
(major goals were not attained and/or resulted in undesirable 
outcomes) [1]. This is a disturbing fact, especially given that 
developing countries have a limited number of resources and 
cannot afford to wastefully spend large amounts of money for 
such ICT based projects. 
Though challenges, strategies and tips have been provided 
by many researchers and practitioners to help the development 
of the e-government in developing countries, there  has been 
limited studies that employ comprehensive approach using 
relevant theoretical framework. As a complex socio-technical 
systems that involves many issues and actors ([13],[6],[3]),  e-
government could be conceptualized from different 
perspectives and assumptions. One promising perspective is 
offered by Actor-Network Theory (ANT) as used by some 
researchers [3],[4]. It is because ANT provides framework to 
capture the complexity of the interaction between the socio-
cultural components as well as the involvement and the need 
to align the technical and political factors. 
This paper aims to fill this gap by using ANT perspective to 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of two e-
government projects in Indonesia. By using this perspective, 
the development of the e-government in developing country 
could be better analyzed in such a way that its development 
could be more successful.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A. Mapping E-government Success and Failure in 
Developing Countries 
Using the „design-reality‟ gap framework [1], there exists a 
simple framework to comprehensively mapping the failures of 
e-government in developing countries.  E-government 
implementation failure could be classified into one of the three 
gaps, namely, „Hard-Soft‟, „Private-Public‟ and „Country-
Context‟ [2].  
 
1) Hard-Soft Gap 
Hard-Soft gap refers to the difference between the actual 
technology (hard) and the reality of the social context (people 
culture, politics, etc.) in which the system operates (soft). This 
argument is also  concurred by several research findings such 
as [3] that technology is just one aspect of heterogeneous 
socio-technical elements that must be managed in the 
information systems project. This is supported by the fact that 
the success of e-government in Kerala India depends on 
resources, skill-level, values, beliefs and motivation of those 
involved in the project in question [4]. It means that lacks of 
training, skills and change management efforts would all 
affect the rate of failure, as they create a wide gap between the 
technology and its social context. 
Therefore, it is imperative for e-government projects to 
establish the service and information needs  for the benefit of 
the served community; and the technology itself should be 
developed in collaboration with the local staff. Most 
importantly, local administrative and political actors should be 
involved, or otherwise the possibility of failure would likely 
increase [5]. This would considerably decrease the Hard-Soft 
gap, and create a sense of local ownership. It is also important 
to involve the people most closely related to the project by 
improving local awareness of the project through some 
promotional campaigns [6].  
The issue of change is also part of the Hard-Soft gap, as an 
e-government initiative constitutes the realignment of working 
practices and government functions. Since public sector must 
change and reengineer its processes to adapt to the new 
technology and culture of an e-government, this can be 
problematic and may result in some stakeholders political 
conflicts  due to their reluctance to share information,  hence 
perceived as a reduction of their authority [7], [8]. In the 
developing countries where corruption and rents are abound, 
the realignment of information flows and the underlying 
power structures are heavily resisted by actors with vested 
interest.  That is why developers of e-government systems 
have to contend with politics, power struggle, and conflict, 
although the literature that deals with this is to date sparse [9], 
[10]. If the resistance is not dealt with by using change 
management or similar initiatives [11], the gap between the 
technology and its social context cannot be bridged.   
 
2) Private-Public Gap 
Private-Public gap refers to the difference between the 
private and public sectors, due to gaps between systems 
designed for the private sector and the reality of the public 
sector into which the systems is transferred. A common 
problem associated with the public sector is uncompetitive 
rates of pay as compared to the private sector. The prevalence 
of this situation impedes the recruitment of high quality IT 
professionals [12], which leads to a lack of public sector skills. 
As a result, e-government projects are often outsourced to the 
private sector, fuelling a clash of culture and values, as well as 
leaving even larger gaps between the design and the reality 
[1]. 
Some governments try to adopt private sector approach 
that brings consequence to change their view of the recipients 
of these e-government projects from citizens to customers. 
This represents a substantial paradigm shift and many 
developing countries face difficulties with e-government 
application. Reference [13] identifies numerous problems with 
seeing a citizen as a customer. A customer needs market 
mechanisms, and the right to choose between different 
alternatives. This is not possible for an e-government 
application that operates as a monopoly. Furthermore, the 
private sector sees customers as a means to increase 
profitability and it introduces price discrimination and similar 
mechanisms to create inequalities between customers. In the 
meantime, the government must provide an equal service to all 
customers (citizen) to create a successful e-government 
platform. 
 
3) Country-Context Gap 
Country- Context gap refers to the difference that exists 
when  applying the e-government systems for both developed 
and developing countries, which arises from the gap between 
systems designed for one country and the reality of a 
developing country into which the system is transferred. 
Developing countries often have a poor ICT infrastructure, 
which constitutes a further obstacle for the implementation of 
the e-government [14]. This lack of infrastructure can cause 
problems if an e-government model from developed country is 
adopted in its entirety by a developing country. One of the 
benefits of the e-government in developed countries is cost 
reduction in terms of the transfer of information and online 
transactions. However, due to a lack of infrastructure in most 
developing countries, the telecommunication costs can be 
high, thereby nullifying this benefit. In situation  like this, it 
may be more appropriate to look at low-tech solutions that fit 
in with the existing infrastructure [5].  
Though there were many researches on e-government 
success-failure,  studies on the political consideration thereof 
is still rare [15], [9]. By political consideration, it means the 
way in which different stakeholders in an e-government 
project relate to one another via political processes such as 
coalition and conflict.  This may happen as most e-
government research attempts tend to draw more from the IS 
(Information Systems) discipline rather than from the domains 
of governance such as political theory and public 
administration [16]. However, following the notion of IS 
development paradigm, the sparse research on political factors 
of e-government might be caused by the way how e-
government is conceptualized. If e-government was 
conceptualized as actor-network, it might entail the important 
of political and alignment process in e-government research. It 
is in accordance with what [3] concluded that „the application 
of ICT is an inherently political process and that a successful 
outcome requires continuous incremental action and 
improvisation to address the ongoing issues as they emerge.‟ 
Further, reference [1] and [2] conclude that the success-failure 
of IS development is much affected by its design process then 
ANT is seen as having a potential and promising theoretical 
framework for the design and implementation of e-
government.  Additionally, reference [17] points out that one 
of the key success in e-government initiative is to make 
coordination among actors who have different interests.   
 
B. Actor Network Theory (ANT) 
Some specific characteristics of ANT need to be mentioned 
to lay foundation to use as research framework. 
 ANT perceives social reality as a complex network of 
relationship that always involves human and non-human 
entities [18].  
 It holds radical assumption that neither human nor non-
human should be given a privilege in determining the 
stability of certain social reality.  
 It rejects essentialism and instead embraces “relational” 
point of view by stating that both human and non-human 
entities are just an effect or outcome of a network (in 
relation to one another) [19].  
 ANT refers all entities (human or non-human) involved in 
this complex network of heterogeneous element as 
“actors” or “actor-network” [18]. 
ANT  labels a stable actor-network as a black box so its 
analysis may focus only on its inputs and outputs. Since a 
black box is an actor-network then its stability is also 
influenced by all material involved.  The black box could be 
opened up and analyzed as an actor-network by tracing all its 
relevant actors and their relationship [21].  
In opening up a “black box” of reality, ANT uses the 
notion of translation [22] to make sense why certain social 
reality finally becomes stable/ unstable over time.  Translation 
could be described as a process in which actor(s) mobilizes 
resources or another actor-network to form allies that result in 
a stabilized actor-network. Therefore, translation explores the 
ways  in which the networks of relations are composed, 
maintained, and made more durable over time. The translation 
process involves four moments (phases) as follows [23]:  
1) Problematization. In this moment, one or more key actors 
define the nature of the problem and the roles of other 
actors to fit the proposed solution. The solution is offered 
in such a way that all actors participated will be subjected 
to some centralised control mechanism labelled as an 
“obligatory passage point (OPP).” 
2) Interessement. Here, all actors identified in the first phase 
are given specific roles and identities and the strategies that 
need to be acted upon which will attract them. This 
attraction is the interessment device that will lead them to 
the next phase.  
3) Enrolment. The success of the strategies related to the 
interessement device will result in the enrolment of actors 
to establish a stable network of alliance. However, the 
stability of this alliance depends on the negotiation process 
to define their roles in the network.  
4) Mobilization. Once the proposed solution gains wider 
acceptance, then an even larger network of absent entities 
are created through some actors acting as spokespersons 
for others. 
 
III. RESERCH METHODOLOGY 
Data used for this interpretive case study were gathered in 
2009 to 2010 from two e-government projects in Indonesia. 
Yogyakarta Cyber Province Initiative (YCPI) and Sragen One 
Stop Service Initiative (SOSSI) projects were selected. These 
two projects are the appropriate cases since the first is 
considered as problematic but the second is a successful one. 
Data gathered include factual (numerical), textual, audio, and 
visual event. Data were collected by conducting some 
observation at the two project sites, inspecting archival 
documents, browsing their websites, and recording semi 
structured interviews. The interviews were conducted in local 
language and involved 22 and 15 personnels respectively. All 
interview sessions lasted from 30 to 90 minutes. Recorded 
interviews were transcribed fully before they were analyzed 
thematically. Twenty  themes were used to code data and were 
developed mainly from ANT translation processes, e-
government development elements, and some related social 
issues such as prosperity, values and beliefs.   
 
IV. CASE DESCRIPTION  
 
A. Case 1 : Yogyakarta Cyber Province Initiative  (YCPI) 
 
Realizing the potential contribution of ICT to improve the 
low quality of public services from the provincial 
administration of Yogyakarta, YCPI aimed to promote a new 
model of managing province that would transform the way the 
state government efficiently and effectively delivered its 
services to public. The model aimed to enable the provincial 
government to serve public better and to speed-up/expedite the 
state development by intensively using ICT. To solve this 
transformational problem, YCPI involved many actors. The 
actors‟s roles, interest and conditions could better be described 
by a network of interests owned by each actor as presented in 
Figure 1. This network may represent the fact that government 
transformation would only happen if an alliance occurs as 
follows. (a) The head of various offices want to fully 
participate in government reform program to serve people 
better; (b) Province Information Office (PIO) staffs are 
consistently willing to manage the implementation of YCPI; 
(c) The Governor of Yogyakarta keeps wanting to serve 
people better; (d) ICT infrastructure functionally operates 
well; (e) Team for Innovation and Change (TiMPII)  is 
continuously supporting change initiatives;  (f) Partnership for 
Government Reform Organization wants to make governance 
reform successful. 
 
 
Figure 1. Actor-Network of YCPI 
 
To solve the problems, YCPI involved six offices to 
develop its own service of excellence as follows: 
1) Education Office: To improve education quality through 
Yogyakarta learning gateway, regional digital library and 
knowledge center network. 
2) Industry and Commerce Office: To improve revenue and 
welfare of the society by enhancing commercial growth. 
It is achieved by increasing access to global as well as 
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regional market and building SME (Small Medium 
Enterprise) business center.  
3) Agriculture Office: To improve farmers‟ welfare through 
agro-business programs by providing information on 
agro-business and market. 
4) Transportation Office: To improve regional economic 
activities through the development of a good 
transportation services.  
5) Tourism Office: To improve people‟s welfare and 
competitiveness through tourism promotion. 
6) Fishery Office: To facilitate the development of fishery 
community and their competitiveness. 
 
Staffs of PIO expressed differently in perceiving the 
progress of YCPI ranging from being realistic to pessimistic. 
Those who were realistic consider YCPI as a long term dream 
and it would automatically be successful as public‟s readiness 
and demand increases over time. Those who were pessimistic 
argued that such similar initiatives had been introduced many 
times long before the notion of e-government existed and had 
never been successful. One of PIO staffs who had been 
actively involved in developing computer-based application 
for government sectors expressed his pessimistic stance by 
having this to say: 
 
“Though there are many small-scale IT applications that 
have been used to support government activities like 
SIMPEG (personnel records system), but after waiting for 
a long time many people keep questioning what  the real 
contributions to society of all these initiatives are?”        
 
Among the six services of excellence, only education and 
commerce programs were considered moving to achieve their 
goals. The education service of excellence even received 
support from Ministry of Communication and Information 
through a Japan-funded project to strengthen school ICT-
readiness by distributing computers and connecting school 
computers to the province‟s library network. The industry and 
commerce service of excellence program managed to set up 
and maintain the so-called Yogyakarta Business Service 
Center (YBSC) to help business community easily get support 
from and exchange information with government agencies and 
business communities. This center offered several services to 
SME (Small Medium Enterprise) in the form of advice, 
consultation, and training in the area of marketing, 
management, ICT adoption, and partnering.  
Although the Governor of Yogyakarta officially launched 
the Agricenter  (the service of excellent of Agriculture Office) 
on July 1st, 2009, less than one year later (May 2010) 
Agricenter was down and could no longer be accessed. When 
the staffs managing the website in Agriculture Office were 
interviewed, one of them explained thus: 
 “… honestly we have no competence to manage this. 
Now we have only one non-permanent staff who has ICT 
background and we are still planning to hire one more 
staff.” 
 
Meanwhile. the Transportation Office planned an 
ambitious transportation information system by integrating it 
with IP-based digital camera installed in some crowded main 
road in Yogayakarta. The system was projected to provide real 
time vehicles traffic situation in some main roads in down 
town Yogyakarta. Unfortunately, until March 2010 the 
transportation information systems had never been 
implemented. The head of Transportation Office explained 
why its service of excellence could not be successfully 
implemented as follows: 
“Obstacles from our office to implement our service of 
excellence include low understanding, readiness and 
commitment of our staffs. We also face organizational 
and financial problems. Besides, I think for the last 4 
years of implementing YCPI, the even bigger problems 
were found in the provincial level…” 
The tourism service of excellence program has been 
developing a good website to promote tourism in Yogyakarta. 
The website published information on some tourist destination 
sites, hotels, events, and the tourism activities. It also 
published news related to tourism and tourism office activities. 
Unfortunately, the website was written only in the Indonesian 
language with which many foreigners were disappointed and 
felt cheated since the name of the website was in English 
www.visitingjogja.com. Though the published information was 
very interesting and could help tourists when visiting 
Yogyakarta, they were neither accurate nor complete as 
reflected by many visitors‟ complaints in its guest book. 
A promising result from fishery service of excellence was 
the development of Fishery Business Center. It was a website 
(http://fbc.perikanan-diy.info/home.php) to effectively connect 
buyers and suppliers of fish products. Buyers could easily 
distribute their demand via SMS (Short Messaging Systems) 
to Fishery Office that subsequently distributed them to all 
registered suppliers. Conversely, anytime a supplier could 
send information about their available products by sending 
massage to Fishery Office that will forward it to all registered 
buyers. Although the initiative was in line with the formulated 
service of excellence from Fishery Office, the number of users 
of this facility was very limited. As of March 2010, there were 
less than 20 registered suppliers and less than 15 registered 
buyers. More importantly, the recorded activities of selling 
and buying fishery products were limited and were not done 
daily. 
Not only did those implementation failures affect YCPI 
performance, but the introduction of government regulation 
No. 41/ 2007 also made YCPI uncertain. This regulation that 
limits the number of offices in the province as well as in local 
administration level had eventually been used to dissolve the 
existence of PIO and was finally reduced into just a section of 
the Transportation and Communication Office.  
 
B. Case 2: Sragen One Stop Service Initiative (SOSSI) 
 
The main idea of establishing SOSSI was very simple but 
fundamental, namely how local administration of Sragen 
regency fulfilled its mandate to better serve public license 
inquiry by providing simple, transparent, accountable, and 
one-stop service. This new kind of service tried to replace the 
common practice of government service where citizens had to 
undergo complicated and unclear process as passing through 
several different office red-tapes. Using this idea, the local 
administration of Sragen tried to implement not only an 
effective and efficient government administration but also a 
new paradigm of work culture that focused on treating citizens 
as government‟s customers. 
The most crucial part in establishing SOSSI was to get 
support from various heads of offices who were currently 
holding authority to issue licenses. It was common that not 
only the head office but also some lower-level government 
staffs abused “power” and authority to manage, control, and 
complicate the issuance of licenses for their personal benefits. 
Another problem was how to efficiently run the one-door 
service just like a private entity.  To manage this situation, the 
head of Sragen regency (the “Bupati”) conducted many 
meetings to promote, explain and solicit support by involving 
related heads of offices, some important personnel from his 
own office and other local legislative bodies. He then 
problematized the establishment of SOSSI by defining the 
roles of each involved actor. Figure 2 provides the description 
of the roles and relationship of some important actors involved 
in the problematization process. This description precisely 
portrays that the establishment of this one stop service 
involved complex actor-network of heterogeneous elements. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Problematization Network of SOSSI 
 
The Bupati attempted to influence and stabilize all the 
actors he defined in the previous step by introducing several 
attractive programs. These programs extended and 
materialized the hypothesis he made concerning the success of 
SOSSI which include the following:  
(a)  License inquiry should be simple, fast, and transparent,  
(b) Offices involved should support the new process of 
delivering licenses by returning its authority back to 
Bupati,  
(c) SOSSI staffs could be transformed to become professional 
workers,  
(d)  ICT and private sector practice could be fully adopted,  
(e)  Excellent license services would attract more investors.  
Using these hypotheses, Bupati implemented three new 
important interessement devices which are: 
(a) Granting SOSSI unit an authority to issue licenses after 
retracting that authority from various offices. 
(b) Facilitating SOSSI to adopt corporate work culture and 
management equipped with new reward system.  
(c) Providing incentives to members of the business 
community who wants to initiate operation in Sragen.   
Some indicators could be attributed to account for the 
success of SOSSI. From the citizens‟ point of view, the 
simple, transparent, and accountable services are found 
satisfactory for them. Based on service satisfaction survey 
with 150 respondents conducted twice a year, the customer 
satisfaction index increased from year to year.  On the last two 
surveys, the customer satisfaction index scored 83.995 % and 
84.005% respectively. One customer who was also an 
entrepreneur justified SOSSI performance by saying thus: 
“This SOSSI is very beneficial for business since I always 
get help whenever I apply a business license. To get a 
business license I do not have to wait for a long time, I am 
provided with convenience facilities and served 
excellently by SOSSI staffs. Based on my experience, I just 
needed less than one week to get license to start my 
business.”  
 
From some government and non-government 
organizations‟ point of view, SOSSI has also been considered 
as a good model of a quality public service provider. It  did 
not come as a surprise that SOSSI then obtained some 
recognition from different parties starting from non-
government organization, local government nation-wide, to 
the president of Indonesia. Moreover, the central government 
of Indonesia had chosen SOSSI as the best practice public 
service agency in Indonesia and encouraged other local 
governments to use it as a model. Consequently, many times 
Sragen had been appointed by the central government to be 
the consultant in developing some government stipulations on 
public services. Sragen was  also consulted by Indonesian 
Commission on Anti-Corruption because the way SOSSI 
promoted transparency was reportedly able to minimize 
corruption practices.   
From the Sragen local government point of view, SOSSI 
was  indeed something to be proud of.  Now, local government 
and people of Sragen were so proud of having at least two 
visitors coming to SOSSI every day doing comparative 
studies. Being proud as a model of service excellence, staffs in 
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SOSSI eventually instilled their confident that they were able 
to contribute good things not only to the people of Sragen but 
to people and government of Indonesia at large. This kind of 
accomplishment also happened particularly every time Sragen 
was invited by other local governments to help the 
establishment of similar services. Staffs of SOSSI now started 
believing that employing new paradigm of work to serve 
public and not to be served was really meaningful and 
rewarding. 
From the economic point of view, SOSSI has managed to 
directly and indirectly increase revenue and investment to 
local government. In 2002 Sragen‟s revenue was only IDR 
22.56 billion but in 2006 it rose to IDR 72.77 billion. 
Similarly, total investment to Sragen was only IDR 592 billion 
in 2002 but it increased to IDR 1.2 trillion in 2006. 
In promoting SOSSI, Bupati stressed that ICT would be 
intensively used. In many occasions Bupati unintentionally 
became a rightful spokesperson of voiceless ICT too 
especially when he himself frequently used ICT to present his 
ideas. He removed over-head projector (OHP) from his 
meeting room to condition all his staffs to used laptop and 
viewer projector instead. Bupati also acted as a legitimate  
spokesperson of ICT  when he strongly encouraged KPDE to 
come up with a computer-based system which enabled him to 
digitally monitor all office performance at any time.  
 
V. DISCUSSION  
 
By holding ontological assumption of e-government as 
actor-network, the main concern of its development is 
maintaining its dynamic association or relationship among 
involved heterogeneous entities. As outlined by Callon ([2]), 
maintaining these relationships will definitely relate to the 
above mentioned four moments of translation.  
The stage of problematization is very important in the 
translation process. This stage is not only important to rightly 
define how to include actors and proposing problems to solve 
but will also affect the understanding of the subsequent stages, 
especially in the interessement stage. In the YCPI case, the 
very broad problem as how to serve public better does not 
guarantee that the problematization process will result in 
direct enrolment of government actors, especially when there 
is no clear benefit to government actors. Although using the 
same notion of improving better public services, SOSSI 
addressed a clearer and simpler problem of how to make 
various license processing easier and faster. This simpler 
problem resulted in easier actors identification and 
interessement strategies formulation. 
Although the problematization in both YCPI and SOSSI 
involved human as well as non-human actors but SOSSI had 
more non-human actor than YCPI. SOSSI also included office 
technology, such as the CCTV, local regulations and ISO 
standards in addition to the ICT infrastructure as non-human 
actors. YCPI only involved the ICT infrastructure in its 
problematization.  
Interessement can be defined as a mechanism or strategy 
used by actors to attract other actors to participate in their 
problematization network. This stage is not easy to formulate 
in a government setting since it cannot be easily based on 
economic and organizational measures, such as efficiency and 
customer satisfaction. It is because government agency is not a 
business entity.  Therefore, the interessement strategy 
formulation should be more based on the assumption that e-
government is a network of heterogenous actors having 
diverse interests. Using this assumption, the interessement 
formulation should account for the sociological perspective in 
which the actors‟ interest relates to their sociological 
interrelationship, such as trust, political alliance, resource 
access, and power sharing. In the SOSSI case, the 
interessement strategies were more sociologically-oriented 
than in YCPI because they accommodate many aspects of 
social life: economic (incentive salary), managerial (ISO 
standards), technical (ICT infrastructure and its system), legal 
(local and central regulation), as well as spiritual (the notion of 
„ikhlas‟) and ideal („coloring‟ Indonesia).   
Related to the role of non-human entities involved in the 
interessement strategies of SOSSI, the new reward system, the 
ISO standards, the ICT, the local regulations, and the office 
technology, such as the CCTV, have all contributed 
significantly to the network stabilization, as ANT assumes that 
durability of a network depends to the durable materials 
participating in the interessement strategies. This findings help 
explain why the SOSSI network was more stable  than YCPI 
network since YCPI had fewer durable materials in the 
interessement strategies.  
Enrolment as a result of successful interessement is then 
can easily be explained. The sociologically comprehensive 
interessement strategies in SOSSI finally enrolled all related 
actors. On the contrary, weak and limited interessement 
strategies in YCPI failed to enroll most actors especially heads 
of offices though their offices had been appointed as parts of 
the excellence service program. Interestingly, the 
comprehensive interessement strategies in SOSSI also resulted 
in more committed staffs since they involved the spiritual 
aspect, namely the notion of „ikhlas.‟ Many staffs gave 
assurance that they were happy if they could serve public 
better. Their enrolment to SOSS was not be based merely on 
the benefits they got but was attached to something deeper 
within their belief.  
As all relevant actors enrolled faithfully to the SOSSI 
network, some of them became spokespersons and they 
represented the rest. Through this representation all involved 
actors were easily mobilized by those who acted as 
spokespersons. This representation involved different actors 
for different mobilization. However, most of the time, the 
Bupati represented many other actors, both human and non-
human.  
Although the success and failure of an e-government 
initiative is a problematic notion (Dada,2002 ),  here in this 
present study they refer to the situation in which the stated 
objectives of the initiative can be, or cannot be, achieved 
significantly. Looking at both cases,  SOSSI has been more 
successful than YCPI. Not only that finally the SOSSI project 
can serve the public better in processing their licenses but 
SOSSI has also received a lot of recognitions from various 
parties and has resulted in increased revenues. Meanwhile for 
YCPI, there was no apparent benefit to the public except that 
they could get free internet access and some schools received 
computer sets and access to the local government‟s library.  
As presented in the preceding section, many findings 
supported the fact that weak problematization of YCPI resulted 
in limited and weak interessement strategies. As such, YCPI 
subsequently failed to enroll actors and consequently made it 
difficult to mobilize them in order to stabilize the network. On 
the contrary, in the SOSSI project, the clear and simple 
problematization equipped with comprehensive interessement 
strategies resulted in faithful enrolment of  many actors who 
became legitimate spokespersons so that, in turn,  they could 
mobilize other actors to stabilize the network. To sum up the 
discussion, Table 1 presents the comparison of the four  
moments of translation processes happened in YCPI and 
SOSSI respectively.   
 
Table 1. Translation Process Comparison Between YCPI and 
SOSSI 
Stage YCPI SOSSI 
Problema 
tization 
The very broad 
problem as how to 
serve public better 
did not result in 
direct enrolment of 
government actors, 
especially when 
there was no clear 
benefit to 
government actors. 
It also made 
difficult to 
formulate 
interessement 
strategies. 
SOSSI addressed a 
clearer and simpler 
problem of how to 
make the processing 
of various licenses 
easier and faster. 
This resulted in 
easier identification 
of actors and 
formulation of 
interessement 
strategies  
 
Interessement 
There were limited 
interessement 
strategies and they 
were focused only 
on the aspect of 
formal and legal 
approaches. 
The interessement 
strategies were more 
sociologically-
oriented for they 
accommodate many 
aspects of social life.  
 Enrolment The limited 
interessement 
strategies failed to 
enroll most actors 
especially heads of 
offices though their 
offices had been 
appointed as parts of 
the excellence 
service program. 
The sociologically 
comprehensive 
interessement 
strategies finally 
enrolled all related 
actors. 
 Mobilization Involved actors 
were difficult to 
mobilize because of 
limited legitimate 
spokespersons.  
All actors were 
effectively mobilized 
because leadership 
was unintentionally 
exercised using de-
centered notion of 
power. 
 
Using success/failure framework ([2]) to interpret these 
findings,  the success of SOSSI and the partial failure of YCPI 
could be categorized in the hard-soft gap. In the case of YCPI, 
the social context (people, culture, and politic) was not 
appropriately managed and aligned while in the SOSSI, it was 
well managed along the project life cycle. In both cases, ANT 
translation process has helped pinpoint how and to what extent 
the hard-soft gap occurred.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
 
Learning from these two cases, the ANT translation process 
has helped explain why YCPI was a problematic initiative and 
SOSSI was a successful one. This conclusion may provide 
guidance to e-government designers to use the ANT translation 
as a development framework. Using this framework, designers 
of the e-government should pay attention on how to formulate 
appropriate problem to address, identify the relevant actors, 
determine suitable objectives, and propose a set of strategies to 
attract all relevant actors to participate in the project. 
Moreover, they should make sure whether the created network 
can produce some legitimate spokespersons representing the 
rest of the actors so that the mobilization process can 
effectively take place. 
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